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ABSTRACT
The philosophy of emotion raises complications for theories of precedent. This
chapter argues that it is productive to think of the effect of some precedents as facets of
legal reasoning that are related to the use and understanding of legal concepts as thick
concepts. In legal reasoning, precedents are routinely invoked to explicate, and/or clarify
the content of legal concepts that are at issue in a case. This chapter develops an
argument by Bernard Williams, i.e., that one must avoid the risk of over-generalizing
the relationship of emotions to thick concepts, by placing it in the context of legal
reasoning. It argues that the several distinctive ways that emotions might interact with
thick legal concepts pose challenges for any general theoretical account of precedent in
legal reasoning. A focus on these different roles that emotions can play in judicial uses
of precedent illuminates some of the more subtle ways in which these uses reveal held
values, ways of seeing, and political commitments. The chapter finds that in at least
some cases where a precedent is invoked to thicken the understanding of a legal concept
at issue in a case, variations in the emotional architecture associated with that invocation
will come in direct tension with the legal concept under examination, or with other legal
values and principles that pertain to equality, and equal treatment under law.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of emotion raises complications for theories of
precedent. Philosophers of emotion have drawn multifaceted maps of the
various ways that emotions interact with evaluative judgements,2 or more
generally, with thick concepts.3 I will argue that it is productive to think of
the effect of some precedents as facets of legal reasoning that are related to
the use and understanding of legal concepts as thick concepts.4 In legal
reasoning, precedents are routinely invoked to explicate, and/or clarify the
content of legal concepts that are at issue in a case.5 Some invocations of
precedent aim to provide a more robust, detailed – or thicker –
understanding of a legal concept by detailing its prior, and at times
paradigmatic, applications. The multiplicity of ways that emotions interact
with thick concepts pose challenges for any general theoretical account of
precedent in legal reasoning and bringing these distinctions to light
illuminates the difficulty of deciphering the subsurface work of emotions in
public-facing legal reasons. In at least some cases where a precedent is
invoked to thicken the understanding of a legal concept at issue in a case,
variations in the emotional architecture associated with that invocation will
come in direct tension with the legal concept under examination, or with
other legal values and principles that pertain to equality, and equal
treatment under law.
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Robert C Solomon, Not Passion’s Slave: Emotions and Choice (Oxford University Press 2003); Ronald
De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (MIT Press 1997); Martha Craven Nussbaum, Upheavals of
Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge Univ Press 2008); Stephen R Leighton, ‘A New
View of Emotion’ (1985) 22 American Philosophical Quarterly 133.
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Bernard Williams (ed), ‘Morality and the Emotions’, Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–
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See e.g., Emily Kidd White, ‘Replaying the Past: Roles for Emotion in Judicial Invocations of
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The question of whether and how precedents might constrain judicial reasoning is here
purposefully left open. The narrow claim is only that in at least some instances, judges have discretion
about the applicability, meaning, reach, and force of past precedents. See, e.g. Maksymilian Del Mar,
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2.

EMOTIONS AND THICK CONCEPTS

In 1972, Bernard Williams published ‘Morality and the Emotions’ in
a small volume of philosophical papers.6 Williams’ explicit aim in the paper,
delivered as his inaugural lecture at Bedford College, London, was to steal
from the ruins of emotivism to say something about the relationship
between emotions and normative judgment. 7 On William’s view,
emotivism’s mistake was evaluating the relationship at too general a level.
Emotivism for Williams ‘offered a connexion between moral language and
the emotions as straightforward and as general as could be conceived in the
form of the thesis that the function and nature of moral judgment was to
express the emotions of the speaker and to arouse similar emotions in his
hearers.’8 Stated as such, the significance of emotions to normative
judgement was either easily disproven (and frequently lacking explanatory
power when faced with counter-examples), or – more important to
Williams – impossible to grip at such a high level of generality.
Williams argued that it would be more useful either to analyze the
ways that at least some sentences semantically incorporate expressions of
emotion9 or, more central to the present paper’s claim, to consider the ways
that ‘a speaker’s expressing emotions should be regarded as a necessary
condition of his utterance’s counting as the making of a moral judgement’.10
This latter path draws from the speech-act view of emotivism, which, as
Williams writes, leads to questions of when it might not be possible to
disentangle emotions from an evaluative judgement,11 for the reason that at
least some evaluative judgements rely on ideas about sincerity (including of
belief, and, subject to some qualifications, commitment) which, for
Williams, implicate emotions. As Williams argues, it is not always possible
to disentangle the emotional aspects of an evaluative judgement without a
loss of meaning, or texture.12 Thick concepts are those in which emotions,
6
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evaluations, and thick descriptions are irrevocably bound up with one
another.13 The position is that in at least some cases, the emotional aspects of
the evaluative judgement at hand are neither secondary, nor severable, and
one consequence of this view is that evaluative judgements are
distinguishable based on the emotional aspects they possess.
William’s arguments in ‘Morality and the Emotions’ were given
careful attention, and extension by his former student Peter Goldie in 2009
in a paper entitled ‘Thick Concepts and Emotions’,14 which sought to bring
its insights to bear on neo-sentimentalist theories, which generally claim the
position that it is appropriate to feel certain emotions when particular forms
of evaluation are called for.15 Goldie revises this position by placing
emphasis on the work of emotional dispositions in order to make sense of
examples where the characteristic emotion that is thought to be intrinsic to
the judgement is not present in an individual instance, though it tends to be
embedded in the actor’s ways of seeing, being and valuing. On this view,
for example, you might know that it is right to feel outrage at certain
political facts and yet fail, for reasons good or bad, to experience that
emotion. We can think, for example, of teaching about a past atrocity and
having the work of choosing words carefully come to obscure or quiet the
anger that one might otherwise find appropriate, or of the way that grief
can stay the feeling of joy that might otherwise surface upon the hearing of
good news. Emotional dispositions are important for Goldie because
emotions relate to each other, reasons, and values in complex and often
protean ways.16 Political and ethical outlooks are revealed in the tendency to
feel emotions with respect to certain others and situations, not in their
presence or absence at a particular moment in time.
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Williams (n 3).
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Goldie, ‘Thick Concepts and Emotion’ (n 3).
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Goldie cites a formulation from Justin D’Arms and Dan Jacobson, which is that ‘to think X has
some evaluative property F is to think it appropriate to feel F in responses to X’. ibid 99.
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Some philosophers of emotion describe being in the grip of a strong emotion as being in an
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emotions and reasons, and the ways that different emotions interact with, or even potentially
preclude one another, see Leighton (n 2); William Lyons, ‘On Emotions as Judgments’ in Stephen
Leighton (ed), Philosophy and the Emotions: A Reader (Broadview Press); Jenefer Robinson, Deeper
than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art (Clarendon Press; Oxford University
Press 2005).
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Thick concepts for Williams and Goldie are ones that have more,
rather than less descriptive content (distinguishing them from thin concepts,
including thin evaluative concepts such as good or right). Thin concepts
operate at a higher level of abstraction than thick ones. For example, the
concept of betrayal is thicker and includes more detail than the concept of
wrongness. In addition to this descriptive content, thick concepts possess
evaluative content that presents as ‘keyed in to approval (or disapproval)’ 17
of the descriptive content giving us a thick-textured ‘idea of the character of
the person, object, or action, so characterized.’18 By contrast, ‘thin concepts
although clearly evaluative, are thought not to have much or any descriptive
conceptual content: we get little if any sense of what the object is like
beyond the fact that the user likes (or dislikes) it, and thinks others should
do the same, and so on.’19 Examples of thin evaluative concepts are good, bad
and right. Such concepts are ‘very abstract vehicles of commendation or
disparagement that can be attached to an almost unlimited range of actions
or states of affairs.’20 Thick concepts are specific and evaluative. Gentleness,
cruelty, and patience are examples. Applications of a thick concept will vary
across contexts. Gentleness with respect to one’s newborn child differs from
the gentleness that one might show a teenager, with differing approaches,
modes, and aims operating in each instance of the application of the thick
concept. As Goldie explains, finding an activity to be cruel attributes a
certain wrongness to that activity, such that the finding of cruelty ‘cannot
be disentangled from its evaluative content.’21 To apply a thick concept like
discriminatory, for example, to an action is to evaluate that action and
condemn that action. As with all thick concepts, the application relies on a
judgement about certain facts, which if they turn out to be false or illfounded, undermine the application of that concept.22
A final characteristic of a thick concept as described by Williams in
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy23 is that they are both world-guided and
action-guiding. World-guided concepts are ones that ‘might be rightly or
wrongly applied’ and action-guiding concepts are ones that tend to be related
17

Simon Kirchin, Thick Concepts (2013), 1-2.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2011) 181.
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Goldie, ‘Thick Concepts and Emotion’ (n 3) 95.
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AW Moore, ‘Maxims and Thick Ethical Concepts’ (2006) 19 Ratio 129, 135.
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to reasons for action, which is not to say they cannot be defeated by other
reasons, including value-based and/or pragmatic reasons for action.24
Action-guiding concepts for Goldie and Williams are sometimes wielded
unconsciously or spontaneously, and at other times after considered
thought. Significantly, and of central importance to the argument below,
these two features can come apart in the application of thick concepts.
World-guiding concepts can be applied by ‘insightful observers’ who don’t
share the values or ways of seeing implied by the concept.25 Those observers
might well predict, for example, how someone who holds the concept as an
action-guiding concept, might think, or act. They might apply the thick
concept to deliberations and activities in ways that they discern others
expect, or they might publicly exclaim and showcase their world-guided (but
not action-guiding) application of the thick concept for other reasons. These
world-guided applications, however, remain distinguishable from an actionguiding application of a thick concept, and it is questions about sincerity and
emotion, for Goldie, which work best to explicate this distinction.
As Williams writes, ‘a man’s emotions has significance for our
understanding of his moral sincerity, not as a substitute for, or just in
addition to, the considerations drawn from how he acts, but as, on occasion
underlying our understanding of how he acts.’26 Williams continues, ‘what
is relevant to our understanding of his moral dispositions is not whether
there are (in our view) grounds or reasons for action of that sort, but
whether he sees the situation in a certain light. And there is no reason to
suppose that we can necessarily understand him as seeing it in that light
without reference to the emotional structure of his thought and action.’27

3.
ROLES FOR EMOTION IN FULLY ENGAGED
APPLICATIONS OF THICK CONCEPTS
Within the field of the philosophy of emotion, it is a longabandoned view that emotions are beyond judgement, or political
evaluation, though this is often the stated rationale for the call to disentangle

24
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legal reasoning from emotion.28 Emotions have affective and cognitive
aspects that relate closely to one another.29 Emotions involve a judgment or
evaluation about an object or an event, and an affective or physiological
aspect (that can be broadly characterized as a pain or a pleasure), which
works to establish their characteristic constituent desires for action, 30 and,
ultimately, differentiates them from other modes of thought or experience.
31
Shame, for example, has a negative painful orientation, and its constituent
desire is to make oneself small or disappear.32 Williams rejects the Kantian
view, which sees emotions as ‘capricious,’ ‘passive,’ and, as the ‘product of
natural causation,’ ‘fortuitously distributed.’33 Such a view, for Williams,
‘suggest[s] a crude view of emotions themselves’ and implies ‘that there is
no way of adjusting one’s emotional response in the light of other
considerations, of applying some sense of proportion, without abandoning
emotional motivation altogether.’34
Individual emotions relate to facts and beliefs that can be subject to
scrutiny, standards of evidence, and rational judgment. Subject to some
qualification, emotions are answerable to reasons.35 They are evaluative in
the sense that they reveal to some extent what an individual finds
28

A burgeoning field of law and emotion literature begins from this premise. See, e.g., Susan A
Bandes and others (eds), Research Handbook on Law and Emotion (Edward Elgar Publishing 2021);
Terry A Maroney, ‘A Field Evolves: Introduction to the Special Section on Law and Emotion’ (2016)
8 Emotion Review 3; Amalia Amaya and Maksymilian Del Mar (eds), Virtue, Emotion and Imagination
in Law and Legal Reasoning (Hart Publishing 2020).
29

Leighton (n 2); Solomon (n 2); Robert C Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life
(Hackett Pub Co 1993); Nussbaum (n 2).
30

John Gardner, ‘The Logic of Excuses and the Rationality of Emotions’ (2009) 43 Journal of Value
Inquiry 315.
31

Within the philosophy of emotion, there are wide-ranging views on how best to describe the
relationship between the physiological and cognitive aspects of an emotion. Questions about
sequence and rank abound. For cognitivists, like Martha Nussbaum, certain emotions tend to follow
from the holding of particular evaluative judgments. Others, like William James, find that
physiological responses precede and assist in forming the cognitive aspects of an emotion. See e.g.,
Nussbaum (n 2); William James, ‘What Is an Emotion?’ (1884) 9 Mind 188. Others find a strong
distinction between these two aspects superficial, with some drawing on contemporary research in
neuroscience to put pressure on both sorts of causal accounts. See e.g., Robinson (n 16); Maria
Gendron, ‘The Evolving Neuroscience of Emotion: Challenges and Opportunities for Integration
with the Law’ in Susan Bandes and others, Research Handbook on Law and Emotion (Edward Elgar
Publishing 2021).
32

Solomon (n 29). See, ‘The Emotional Register’.

33

Robinson (n 27).

34

Williams (n 3) 224.

35

Gardner (n 30); Williams (n 3).
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important,36 and it is for this reason that Robert Solomon describes them as
‘eudemonistic’, and as ‘engagements with the world’37 for their tendency to
reveal deep and personal understandings of value (for good or ill), and, at
times even, a (well-placed or not) sense of justice. Given that emotions are
evaluative in this sense, it is possible to press both upon the facts or beliefs
underlying an emotion and upon the judgment motivating an emotion.38
As emotions are object-directed, new information about an object can work
to revise an emotional state39 (though not always for some emotions can
prove resistant, or irrational).40 Further, as emotions reflect evaluative
judgements, they are open to probing questions about the status of the value
underlying one’s emotional concerns.
To move deeper into the distinction outlined above concerning the
world-guided and action-guiding aspects of thick concepts, Goldie draws on a
paper by Adrian Moore on the difference between understanding a concept
and being fully engaged with a concept. As Moore wrote,
Thick ethical concepts can be grasped in two ways, an engaged way and a
disengaged way. To grasp a thick ethical concept in the disengaged way is
to be able to recognize when the concept would (correctly) be applied, to
be able to understand others when they apply it, and so forth. To grasp a
thick ethical concept in the engaged way is not only to be able to do these
things, but also to feel sufficiently at home with the concept to be prepared
to apply it oneself, where being prepared to apply it oneself means being
prepared to apply it not only just in overt acts of communication but also
in how one thinks about the world and in how one conducts one’s affairs.41

Emotions play a role with respect to both understanding and being
fully engaged with a thick concept. In terms of the former, understanding a
thick concept often means understanding something about its emotional
architecture, including features of the emotions that it engages (including
their cognitive and physiological aspects, dominant metaphors, and
36

Nussbaum (n 2).

37

Solomon (n 2); Solomon (n 29).

38

Nussbaum (n 29).

39

Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought; Solomon, The Passions.

40

Williams (n 3) 224.

41

Goldie, ‘Thick Concepts and Emotion’ (n 3) 96. Citing Moore (n 22) 137.
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constituent desires for action)42 that characteristically apply with respect to
them. In terms of the latter, however, emotions and emotional dispositions
play a significant and non-severable role in the full engagement of a concept.
They do so in complex, typically potent, fluid, and sometimes elliptical
ways. In many cases, what makes the living by the thick concept in question
sincere is an emotional disposition, which entails the tendency to
emotionally engage with circumstances involving its relevant applications.
Thick concepts don’t exist in a vacuum. They have as Goldie puts it,
a focus and a stance. The focus is the object of concern, and the stance is the
‘emotional “attitude” held towards the focus’.43 Sincerity, for Williams and
Goldie, becomes an important facet of the application of a thick concept
because the expression of a judgment will only constitute fully embracing or
living by a concept where the person in question ‘shares (subject to the
above qualifications) the feelings and emotions that give application of the
concept its point.’44 These sincere views stemming from living by and fully
embracing a thick concept tend then, subject to some qualifications, to
motivate action, ways of seeing, and patterns of reasoning.45 This, for
Goldie, is the deep connection between thick concepts and emotion, i.e.,
that a sincere full engagement with a concept implicates character and
emotional dispositions.

4. PROBLEMS FOR PRECEDENT WITH THICK LEGAL CONCEPTS
AND EMOTION
Invocations of precedent can contribute additional layers of meaning
and detail to legal concepts, a process which, drawing from the field of
ethical theory, reflects the notion of thickening.46 This is a backward-looking
process that engages prior uses of a legal concept, across differing contexts,
to build a better grip on its meaning and implications for the case at bar.
42

Solomon (n 29).

43

Goldie, ‘Thick Concepts and Emotion’ (n 3) 105. The contents of this emotional attitude can shift
depending on the circumstances. When we value someone, we can feel angry when they are
disrespected, concerned when they are sick, happy when they are happy etc.
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Williams (n 24); Samuel Scheffler, ‘Morality Through Thick and Thin a Critical Notice of Ethics
and the Limits of Philosophy’ (1987) 96 The Philosophical Review 411.
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Often the process flags paradigmatic examples or circumstances which
engage the concept.47 Similar to the view held here, Maksymilian Del Mar
argues that it is useful to think of precedents as ‘thick resources’, the
‘dynamic content’ of which is to some extent constrained by stabilising
practices (e.g. textbooks, re-statements of the law), but nevertheless never so
constrained as to be incapable of being construed as relevant in a novel
way.’48 References to precedent in the explication and use of legal concepts
are a constitutive aspect of the practice of common law legal reasoning,
which is not to say that anything about the use of particular precedents or a
more general theory on the level of constraint they supply is uncontested.49
The work of finding and using precedents in legal reasoning has never
lacked a politics.50
Judges can invoke precedents as applications of thick concepts in
world-guided and/or action-guiding ways. Whether and how judges use
precedents to fully engage with an application of a legal concept can have an
impact on legal reasoning. A fully engaged application of a thick legal
concept requires the use of precedent that reflects an emotionally inflected
stance towards a focus (i.e., an object of concern) that depends upon a
particularized and sincere form of valuing, or way of seeing, which
concerns that focus. The possibility of a fully engaged application of a thick
legal concept immediately raises skeptical questions about what precisely at
the level of theory is required by judges in their applications of thick legal
concepts, and so too, about the self-awareness of judges, and the ability of
judges (or anyone) to either fully understand and/or manage their own
emotionally imbued set of value-commitments and ways of seeing.51
Leaving aside questions concerning the scope of the discretion
permitted to a judge in the use of precedent, the claim here is that legal
concepts can exude a certain thinness that references to precedent can work
to supplement.52 Precedents can be used to fully engage with an application
47

White, ‘Replaying the Past’ (n 4).

48
Maksymilian Del Mar, ‘What Does History Matter to Legal Epistemology?’ (2011) 5 Journal of the
philosophy of history 383, 386.
49

Emily Kidd White, ‘Notes on a Supreme (Legal) Fiction’ 47 Journal of Legal Philosophy.
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For an argument on the interpretation of thin legal concepts, see C McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity
and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 655.
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of a legal concept, they can be used to give the appearance of this full
engagement, they can be applied by a judge acting in the manner of an
‘insightful observer’, or by a judge wishing to present themselves as an
‘insightful observer’ applying the concept. Given the existence of these
distinct possibilities, even where the discretion of the judge to use precedent
to thicken the legal concept at issue seems limited, the challenges outlined
below pose deep problems for theories of precedent that profess the
normative value of public reason, or other substantive rule of law values,
such as the commitment to equal treatment under the law. Depending on
the theory of legal interpretation at play, casting light on these distinctive
possibilities seems to require either that judges always (under an account
where moral or evaluative reasoning is part of legal reasoning) or never
(under an account where moral or evaluative reasoning is excluded from
legal reasoning) – without exception - show a sincere full (that is, actionguiding) engagement with a legal concept in the application of a
precedent.53
a) The difficulty of distinguishing between world-guided and actionguiding applications of a legal concept
The practices associated with the use of precedents in common law
judicial reasoning make it difficult to discern instances where legal concepts
are being applied in world-guided but not action-guiding ways. It is difficult
to discern on the face of a written judgement when a judge is using a legal
concept but not embracing or fully engaging with that concept. In several
instances, this might not matter to the case outcome, and it may or may not
be decipherable on the face of the judgement’s reasoning. And yet, the roles
that emotions play with respect to world-guided and action-guiding
applications of a thick concept are quite distinct. This is significant because
it is not clear that a legal concept will be applied as vigorously or
searchingly where it is not action-guiding. And so too, because the
implications of this focus on emotion for accounts of legal reasoning are
stark and demanding. In what follows, I raise two distinct issues which
suggest that, in at least some instances, the role emotions play with respect
to some thick legal concepts impact judicial reasoning.

53

I thank Felipe Jimenez for pushing me to clarify this implication of my argument.
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i) Emotions as Aids to Understanding
In the pages of a 1979 New Yorker,54 Grace Paley’s short story ‘Love’
ends with the protagonist blowing through the aisles of a grocery store
before running into an old friend with whom she’d had a terrible argument
years before. They had long since stopped speaking. Seeing her friend’s
lovely face, a face that she had previously delighted in, she finds her own
hand advancing to this woman’s hand, taking it up and giving it a kiss. Her
friend smiles at the gesture, rearranging the past, and settling into place a
new range of possibilities.
Paley here gives us an inroad into a discussion on the epistemic
benefits of emotions in judicial reasoning. Crucially, the use of the term
‘epistemic’ here pertains to the cognitive process of understanding55 in
relation to the construction of legal arguments and findings, not to
ascertainment of anything like an objective moral fact.56 As in Paley’s story,
emotions move and motivate us; they can rearrange our understandings of
pertinent facts and highlight certain features of a situation that are
important to us.57 Emotions have epistemic functions even where they do
not ground our evaluative judgments. They can startle and ‘capture and
consume our attention, [thereby] facilitating a reassessment or reappraisal of
the evaluative information that emotions themselves provide.’58
Emotions can serve epistemic functions, allowing us to focus on
features of the world that we consider important or, conversely, to identify
threats to those persons, things, or values that we hold dear.59 When we
value something, certain features of the object of our value (a landscape, an
event, even an idea) can stand out to us.60 Emotions can play positive (or
54

Grace Paley, 'Love', The New Yorker (October 8, 1979).

55

See e.g. Catherine Z Elgin, ‘Emotion and Understanding’ in Georg Brun Doguoglu, Ulvi and
Dominique Kuenzle (eds), Epistemology and emotions (Routledge 2016).
56

See e.g. Thomas Nagel, ‘Types of Intuition’ (2021) 43 London Review of Books.

57

Catherine Z Elgin, ‘Impartiality and Legal Reasoning’ in Amalia Amaya and Maksymilian Del Mar
(eds), Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning (Hart Publishing 2020).
58

Michael S Brady, Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience (Oxford University
Press 2013).

59

See e.g. Lawrence Blum, ‘Iris Murdoch’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2022, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University).

60

Emily Kidd White, ‘Till Human Voices Wake Us: The Role of Emotions in the Adjudication of
Dignity Claims’ (2014) 3 Journal of Law, Religion and State 201.
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negative) epistemic roles in judicial reasoning by gripping and focusing the
attention61 of the presiding judge or judicial panel, thereby prompting a reevaluation of the impugned law, the legal dispute, or of the transactions and
relations involved in the case.
For good or ill, emotions at work in the application of a legal
concept ‘can motivate the search for reasons that bear on the accuracy of
their own initial assessment of some object or event, and thus motivate the
rational reappraisal or reassessment of that object or event.’62 It is significant
to note here that the attention-directing features of emotions are far from
apolitical, and raise a series of questions about whose emotions are legible to
those in power, whose emotions are perceived to be legitimate, compound,
deeply-felt, or authentic, 63 and which harms, wrongs, or interferences
warrant emotional concern.64
Emotions can work to focus critical attention on the object of
emotion, or on a line of reasoning that engages that object, inviting a
process of cognitive reflection65 that can work to diffuse, intensify, or
change the emotion (we can think of fear moving to indignation, or to
laughter upon further reflection, for example)66 or, more broadly, one’s
understanding of the matter at hand. Jenefer Robinson’s understanding of
emotions-as-process underscores the ways emotions might contribute to
motivation and understanding:
When human beings have an emotional response to something in
the (internal or external) environment, they make an affective
appraisal that picks that thing out as significant to me (given my
wants, goals, and interests) and requiring attention. This affective
appraisal causes physiological changes, action tendencies, and
expressive gestures, including characteristic facial and vocal

61

Brady (n 58) 13.

62

Ibid.

63

Bandes, ‘Remorse and Criminal Justice.’

64

Emily Kidd White, ‘On Emotions and the Politics of Attention in Judicial Reasoning’ in Amalia
Amaya and Maksymilian Del Mar (eds), Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Legal Reasoning (Hart
Publishing 2020).
65

See e.g. Robinson (2005).

66

Peter Goldie, ‘Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and Planning’ (2009) 67 The Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism 97, 10.
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expressions, that may be subjectively experienced as feelings, and
the whole process is then modified by cognitive monitoring.67

As Robinson emphasizes, these various elements are ‘interconnected’:
‘physiological responses reinforce attention’; ‘action tendencies and behavior
may change the environment so that the emotional situation changes or
dissipates’; and ‘(c)ognitive monitoring may confirm or disconfirm affective
appraisals.’68 Emotions direct our attention to various features and attributes
that resonate with us. Emotions motivate the finding of evidence and
analogies that appear relevant to the legal question before the court, and, so
too, for good or ill contribute to the smoothing out of various disanalogies
and/or evidentiary hurdles that might otherwise present. Emotions have
attention-capturing shortcutting functions (fear is the usual example as it
inspires a response often before a full cognitive appraisal has had time to
form).69 Emotions often work as shorthand in this regard; they can be fastworking, motivating processes (we can even think of the names of certain
precedents themselves carrying tone-filled, emotional weight, which is not
to say well-known precedents won’t conjure up even radically different
associations across groups).
For Williams, it is possible to understand correct applications of a
thick concept without embracing that concept. In support of this argument,
Goldie raises Moore’s example of the concept of the Sabbath suggesting that
‘this is a concept whose correct application is readily grasped by those who
do not embrace the concept in an engaged way.’70 I am not sure this always
holds. Even with respect to the example at hand, the Sabbath, it is not clear
that there isn’t some lack, or difference, of understanding that might
translate into a different emphasis, a difference in tone, weight, or
considered detail (including the ability to grip some of the concept’s more
ineffable aspects) that might lead to an inapt application in particular
circumstances. Emotions signal that something is important to an agent and
in a particular way. Emotions are important to value-directed practices not
only for reasons of authenticity and sincerity but also for understanding.
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As stated above, ‘insightful observers’ will often be able to perform,
or give heed to any expected emotional aspects that would be involved in
fully embracing a legal concept (a particular conception of liberty, for
example), for this is precisely what it means to apply a thick concept in a
world-guided way. If, however, I am correct that there remains some
difference, in at least some cases, in the understanding and application of
thick legal concepts through precedent when judges apply them in a worldguided but not in an action-guided way (with the difference having to do
with an emotional engagement that is either live in the particular instance
or present at a dispositional level), then this poses a challenge to existing
theories of legal reasoning. As Moore writes, ‘to ‘embrace’ a concept is to
grasp it in the engaged way. It is to enter into the spirit of the concept, to
have whatever outlook gives the concept its point, to live by the concept.’71
There is a difference between chronicling emotions and experiencing
emotions.72 There is a difference between using emotion words because
they appear appropriate to the task, like empathy and compassion, and
experiencing either of these things.73
I have written in the past of the concern that judges might employ
disordered or false versions of empathy in their legal reasoning practices,
drawing on the language of the claimant, without real efforts to understand
their station or point of view.74 The concern here is how judges might
employ precedents to signal a fully engaged application of a thick legal
concept whilst only drawing on precedents in a world-guided manner to
serve their own political outlooks and intuitions (or more perniciously, their
own stereotypes, and prejudices) about the claimant and the case, thereby
failing to give the legal concept full weight,75 and, so too, offering a false
public account of their own reasoning process (ie., an insincere performance
of full engagement). This is not an argument in favour of sincere, fully
engaged applications of thick legal concepts, which can obviously be
objectionable at the level of substantive politics (we know all too well the
problem of sincerely held bad politics).76 It is the clarification that given the
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motivating and epistemic features of emotions, there is reason to believe
that the use of precedent will differ across world-guided, and action-guiding
applications of the thick legal concept at issue in a case. The above concern
could, notably, also run in the opposite direction, with a judge purporting
to use precedent to apply a thick legal concept in a world-guided way
(aiming, perhaps, for the cloak of authority associated with a cool
emotionally disengaged application) when in fact they are using precedent
to apply a thick legal concept in a fully embraced and sincere action-guiding
way (whether they are self-aware to know this or not).
ii) In at least some cases, the law seems to require that a thick legal concept
be applied in an action-guiding manner, drawing on certain emotions
(whilst resisting others)
The idea of sincerity that is so important to Williams takes on
additional complex dimensions when we enter the terrain of legal
reasoning. Sincerity might operate, or fail to operate, at multiple levels with
respect to the practice of legal reasoning. Insincerity might signal a chasm
between the private normative and/or political views of the judge, and their
pronouncement on the status of a particular precedent as binding. Or, as set
out above, the difference between a legal concept that is applied via
precedent in a world-guided but not an action-guiding manner.
One response to the foregoing might be to say that the expectation
is that while judges must draw on precedents to provide thicker
understandings of past applications of a legal concept, they are never
required to fully engage with the legal concepts that they then apply to the
case at bar. Judges in common law legal systems must look to precedents to
thicken their understanding of the world-guided aspects of the legal concept
under examination before applying it in ways that might be defended as
correct. There are no expectations of sincerity, or with respect to emotional
engagement, at play when considering the demands of the judicial role.
Judges are meant to take on the role of the ‘insightful observer’, charged
with the task of understanding the legal concepts that are relevant to the
present case and applying them regardless of their own political
commitments or sense of justice etc.
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This is one description of the role that seems right to defend though
somewhat incomplete, and, at times, incongruent with some expectations
concerning substantive rule-of-law norms, and with respect to the judicial
role itself (on the view outlined above, might sincerity not be required with
respect to one’s adherence to the judicial role, for example?).77 There is
much variety and variance in the writing styles of common law judges.78
Common law judges sometimes write judgements as if there is space
between their own political views and what they take the law to require,
but not always.79 And yet, with respect to at least some legal concepts and
values, something seems awry in requiring too strict a separation between
the legal concepts and values that require application through the strictures
of legal reasoning and those that might be privately held by the judge or
judicial panel.80 It is not altogether clear that judges aren’t meant to feel the
weight of some thick legal concepts, like dignity for example.81
A cold distance is, as John Gardner wonderfully put it, not an
unemotional stance, it is just another emotional disposition, and one that
itself reveals value commitments or the lack of value commitments.82 In at
least some cases, something at the level of value commitment and at the
level of legal interpretation appears awry where a judge experiences no
emotions with respect to the use, description, or interpretation of
precedents (or when visiting certain facts within them),83 or where they
display the wrong emotions when using precedent to thicken a legal
concept. At times, a cold distance is the inapt or wrong emotional response.
As John Gardner memorably wrote, ‘there is no general or default answer to
the question of whether a sober appreciation of reasons for action is more
reasonable than an emotionally-charged appreciation of those same reasons
for action. Being cool, calm, and collected is just another place on the
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emotional map, with no special claim to rational efficiency.’84 He continues,
‘Neither the passionate nor dispassionate among us has any a priori claim to
be generally more effective in acting in conformity with reasons about
value.…Sometimes, surely, a cold calculation is just the opposite of what is
called for.’85 Emotions are, in Gardner’s terms, precisely those that are called
for in the practice of a value. As Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegemon
write:
Emotions may show valuings rather than value: how a person
values something, not the value something has or the value the
person takes it to have. Sometimes people have emotions that
contain and reveal valuings, not values; and sometimes people
have emotions that reveal a lack of valuing, even in the face of
acknowledged value… I may not value, or may barely value,
what I know has great value. For example, I may not value or
may barely value a given school of music, even though I know
– and know directly, for myself, not just by being told by those
I know do know – that it is of the very highest value.86

In at least some cases, applications of a legal value will appear inapt
where a judge appears not to have the requisite emotions when drawing on
various precedents, or interpretation of precedents, or, in the alternative,
where they display the wrong emotions.87 Martha Nussbaum, for example,
argues that disgust has no place in law because no other emotion paints its
object in such a negative and contemptuous light.88
b) The concern over inconsistent or unequal applications of actionguiding concepts
The final critique of the neo-sentimentalist position in Goldie’s
paper also stems from a concern about generality in the theoretical
construction of the relationship between emotions and thick concepts. Here
Goldie addresses Moore’s revision to the neo-sentimentalist’s position,
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critiquing that it does not account ‘for a limited domain of a fully engaged
application of a thick concept.’91 Here Goldie draws upon an example from
R.M. Hare of an aggressive and demeaning initiation ceremony for recruits
at a military academy taking place under the authority of an official who
knows perfectly well how to fully engage with the concept of cruelty when it
comes to his own children. Goldie notes how the official might withhold
the use of the thick concept of cruelty in judgments about what had been
done to the recruits,92 or, more subtly, use the term knowing how it applies
in the usual case while recasting some of its implications (‘the ceremony was
cruel but entertaining’). In the second case, we could say that this official
was not fully engaged with the concept in this context though they are in
other parts of their life. As Goldie writes, ‘(s)uch a person is by no means
inconceivable nor unimaginable.’93 Summarizing the argument, he writes,
‘for any particular person, full engagement with a thick concept, and
correlatively its action-guidedness in application by that person, need not
apply across all domains. One can be fully engaged in a concept here but
not there.’94
In the field of legal reasoning, this insight translates into a concern
that judges use precedent to fully engage in the application of a legal value
when certain issues are at stake, or more perniciously, when the rights, or
interests of certain groups are at stake, but not always, and not across all of
the applicable domains.95 Like the official above, they also might not see
how they have carved out a space where they simply won’t recognize the
application of the thick concept as apt, or they will readily (and not always
self-knowingly) craft narratives as to why certain suspensions, revisions,
qualifications, or provisos to the concept’s application are appropriate. The
philosophy of emotion here elicits this deep criticism of judicial reasoning
that is otherwise difficult to pinpoint because on the face of the legal
reasoning in question, the applicable legal concepts will either be seen as
non-applicable, or they will be referenced but only in a superficial or lifeless
manner. Susan Bandes has, for example, written of how the emotion of
remorse implicates something of a future gaze, and a promise of better
behaviour. She finds, devastatingly, that judges are often less apt at reading a
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concrete future (full of family, success, education, etc.) for poor and/or
racialized defendants, and hence are less likely to attribute to them the
emotion of remorse, a factor which has concrete consequences in terms of
sentencing.96 Cast in more general terms, the concern is with a legal test
applied in seeking and searching ways for some claimants but not others, or
with respect to some legal rights and not others, with precedents marshalled
to give apparent warrant to such disparate results, obscuring the structured
inequality at play.97
This is a powerful challenge for theories of judicial reasoning that
encompass the use of precedent. Masked by the world-guided applications of
legal concepts (which might even evince the appearance of the right and
requisite emotional stances - outrage at cruelty, anger at discrimination
etc.), the legal reasoning might look defensible on its face, but it will lack
the fully engaged application of the concept. A masked, bloodless application.
We know all too well in our political life about half-hearted
attributions of rights, for example, to refugees and migrants.98 Some legal
concepts get applied in highly motivated ways and others not, and with
respect to some interests and not others. These uneven fully engaged
applications can at times undermine the legal value in question (a value like
human dignity that is meant to be attributed equally to all human beings),
and so too the principles and norms of application concerning equality and
equal treatment before the law.
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5.

CONCLUSION: DEEPER THAN LEGAL REASON
She felt a warning tremor as she spoke, as though some
instinct deeper than reason surged up in defense of its
treasure. But Darrow's face was unstirred save by the flit
of his half‐amused smile.
Edith Wharton, The Reef99

Embedded in the context of legal reasoning, the core insight in the
above-referenced papers by Williams and Goldie – that one must avoid the
risk of over-simplifying or over-generalizing the relationship of emotions
to thick evaluative concepts – seems as fruitful as ever. A focus on emotion
illuminates some of the more subtle ways in which judicial uses of precedent
reveal held values, ways of seeing, and political commitments, and so too,
some of the stark demands placed on the judicial role by various theories of
judicial reasoning and precedent.
A focus on emotions in the use of precedent in the application of
legal concepts reveals a distinction between full engagement and something
less than full engagement, that might otherwise be difficult to ascertain.
This distinction can work to derogate from commitments to both
substantive and procedural commitments to equality and equal treatment
under the law. Nothing in this paper constitutes an argument in favour of
all legal concepts being applied in a fully engaged manner. This is a separate
question of ethics, and politics. The question, however, of whether this is
what the law calls for remains a pressing, critical and uncomfortable one.
Questions about judicial sincerity and self-knowledge seem overly intimate
and yet highly relevant.
Gerry Simpson writes that one motivation for his recent book that
details some of the sentimental aspects of international law is ‘the hunch that
most of what is interesting in life occurs off-screen…’100 This hunch is here
shared and taken as a warning that much of the work of emotions in legal
reasoning is subsurface, impacting our understanding of legal questions in
myriad ways. Legal concepts will be fully embraced at the service of some
goals, and persons, and ways of life but not others. The deeper-than-reason
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political outlooks of judges shape reasoning efforts and case outcomes in
ways that are, at times, hard to ascertain and hold to account. This isn’t
necessarily a fatalistic conclusion. Rather, it is a call for subsurface emotional
dispositions, and the politics they reveal, to be drawn out and subjected to
critique. Or, more broadly, a call to question whether present processes of
adjudication are constructed to deliver on the norms and commitments they
profess.
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